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et al.: FRE and NY Evidence Comparison

RULE 803(1): PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSION
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) states:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or
explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was
perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter. 1

The law of evidence was slow to recognize an exception to the
hearsay rule for present sense impressions. 2 The primary reason
for this hesitation was the belief that statements made about an
event without an accompanying nervous stimuli might be
unreliable. 3 The courts felt that, unlike the exception for excited
utterances, 4 present sense impressions lacked a sufficient indicia
of reliability because they were sought to be admitted based
solely upon the contemporaneous making of the statement. 5
In 1942, a state appellate court recognized the inherent
reliability of such statements in Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis.6
1. FED. R. EvD. 803(1).
2. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S

EVIDENCE 803(1)[01], at 87-88 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 1995) (stating
that the reluctance to admit these statements was largely based upon the fact
that many courts relied upon the criticized phrase of "res gestae"); see also
JoHN HENRY WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §1757, at 238 (James H.
Chadboum ed., 1974) (maintaining that a startling event is a necessary
prerequisite to admitting spontaneous exclamations to ensure their
trustworthiness).
3. The courts believed that out of court statements made under the
influence of an exciting event were reliable because they were less likely to be
the product of fabrication. See FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee's note.
4. FED. R. EvD. 803(2). The hearsay exception for excited utterances is
defined as: "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while
the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or
condition." Id.
5. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, § 803(1)[01], at 87-88.
6. 161 S.W.2d 474 (Com. App. Tx. 1942). In this case, the plaintiffs
sought recovery for injuries sustained as a result of a collision between the
plaintiff's automobile and the defendant's truck. Id. at 475. Defendant sought
to admit statements made by a motorist who, after witnessing the plaintiff's car
"zig zagging" and traveling at an excessive speed, stated that the driver "must
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In Houston, the court found that the statement's reliability was
ensured by factors other than the excitement of the event,
including the close proximity between the event and the
statement, and the fact that the statements were made to a third
person who was at the scene and who was subject to crossexamination. 7 The Commission of Appeals of Texas stated that
the time factor offered two safeguards: (1) the avoidance of
errors because of the declarant's clear memory, and (2) the lack
8
of time to make a calculated misstatement.
After the Houston case, courts gradually began to accept this

exception to the hearsay rule; however, "[tihe principal impetus
for recognition of the hearsay exception for unexcited statements
of present sense impressions came through the rulemaking
process." 9 The rule was recognized by its inclusion in the Model
have been drunk" and could have caused the accident. Id. at 476. The
Commission of Appeals of Texas reversed the trial court's decision and held
that the statement should be admitted because of its exceptional reliability
under the hearsay exception for spontaneous declarations. Id. at 477. The court
further stated that the decision to admit the evidence was not within the
discretion of the trial court when the circumstances under which the statement
was made fell within an established rule of evidence. Id.
7. Id. at 476-77.
8. Id. at 477. Though there were virtually no federal cases which
recognized the present sense impression exception before the promulgation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, some cases seemed to support this exception.
Emens v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 223 F. 810 (N.D.N.Y. 1915), cert. denied,
242 U.S. 627 (1916). See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 2, 803(1)[01] at
89. In Einens, a car and a train collided. 223 F. at 812. There was inconsistent
testimony as to whether or not the train had blown its whistle before it crossed
the highway and caused the accident. Id. at 815-19. A witness who was in
close proximity to the collision was allowed to testify that his wife said, "[d]o
you suppose the people in that automobile see the train?" and "[w]hy don't the
train whistle?" Id. at 825. Though the evidence was admitted only to show
whether the husband's attention was directed to the sounding or the nonsounding of the bell, the court stated that the wife's testimony "might be
competent" on the issue of whether the train actually did signal. Id. at 826.
The court further stated that since the wife's statement "was entirely
disinterested, and it was spontaneous (drawn out by the conditions existing),
and there was no premeditation. . . it was relevant". Id.
9. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 271, at 475 (John William Strong ed.,
4th ed. 1992).
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10

Rule 803(1) allows

Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules.

for the admission of out of court statements, even absent a
startling event, under the following conditions: (1) the declarant

must have personally witnessed the described event; (2) the
declaration must be an explanation or description of the event;
and (3) the declaration must be contemporaneous with the event
or made immediately thereafter. 11 As stated in the rule, the
availability of the declarant to testify or to be cross-examined is
12
immaterial.
In addition, courts have read the language of 803(1) plainly to
indicate that the rule does not require corroboration before the
statement may be admitted. 13 In U.S. v. Medico, 14 for example,
the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to admit
certain evidence at trial under Rule 804(b)(5), 15 the "catch-all"

10. Id.
11. FED. R. EviD. 803(l). See U.S. v. Mejia-Velez, 855 F. Supp. 607,
613 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (finding that tapes of emergency "911" telephone calls
made by eyewitnesses contemporaneously to a shooting were admissible since
all three requirements were satisfied).
12. FED. R. EvID. 803(1).
13. See U.S. v. Medico, 557 F.2d 309, 315-16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 986 (1977).
14. Id. at 309. In Medico, which involved a prosecution for armed robbery
of a bank, a bank employee was given information through the bank's front
door regarding the getaway car and license plate number from two witnesses
outside the bank. Id. at 311. This employee's testimony was allowed at trial
even though the government could not locate these witnesses. Id. at 313-16.
15. FED. R. EViD. 804(b)(5) provides:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a
material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which
it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted
under this exception unless the proponent of it makes kmown to the
adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide
the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, "the
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exception used to admit statements which are not specifically
outlined by the rules but which the court finds equally
trustworthy. 16 In dicta, the Second Circuit stated that the
"testimony meets all the specific requirements for admission as a
present sense impression under Rule 803(1)" even though there is
no direct corroboration by an equally percipient witness. 17 Thus.
the Second Circuit impliedly rejected corroboration as a predicate
to admission of present sense impressions under Rule 803(1),
which clearly does not indicate such a requirement on its face.
Although the present sense impression exception is recognized
on the federal level, until recently, this exception to the hearsay
rule was not recognized by the New York courts. 18 However, in
the 1993 case of People v. Brown, 19 the New York Court of
Appeals recognized the formal existence of the present sense
impression exception in New York. 20 Brown involved a "911"
call and was an important use of the present sense impression
rule. 2 1 In Brown, the court found that the testimony of the police
officers who arrived promptly at the crime scene and
apprehended suspects fitting the description given in the "911"
telephone calls, was sufficient corroboration for tapes of the
"911" calls to be admitted. 22 The Brown court held that
"spontaneous descriptions of events made substantially
contemporaneously with the observations are admissible if the
proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it,
including the name and address of the declarant.
16. Medico, 557 F.2d at 316. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5).
17. 557 F.2d at 315.
18. See People v. Watson, 109 Misc. 2d 71, 437 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1981), rev'd, 100 A.D.2d 452, 474 N.Y.S.2d 978 (2d Dep't
1984) (reversing lower court's decision to allow present sense impressions
even though New York had yet to formally recognize such a hearsay
exemption).
19. 80 N.Y.2d 729, 610 N.E.2d 369, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696 (1993).
20. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d at 731, 610 N.E.2d at 370, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
In Brown, the court held that two "911" telephone calls describing a burglary
in progress were properly "admitted under the present sense impression
hearsay rule." Id.
21. Id.

22. Id. at 736-37, 610 N.E.2d at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
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23
descriptions are sufficiently corroborated by other evidence."
The court further stated that the statements do not have to be

made by a participant in the event, and the identity of the
declarant does not have to be known. 24 Corroboration at trial of

an equally percipient witness is, therefore, not required, 25 but
some form of corroboration is required. 2 6 The sufficiency of the
corroboration depends on the specific facts of each case and is
left to the discretion of the trial court. 2 7 Although it resolved the
corroboration issue, Brown left open the question of whether the

declarant must be unavailable.
This question was resolved in People v. Buie.2 8 In Buie, a

"911" tape of a homeowner describing, in detail, a figure
departing his home immediately following a burglary was held

admissible under New York's present sense impression hearsay
exception. 29 In affirming the lower court's decision, the Court of
Appeals held that New York does not require the declarant to be
unavailable in order to admit evidence under the present sense

hearsay exception. 30 Thus, when seeking to admit evidence under
the present sense impression hearsay exception in either the
federal or New York courts, the unavailability of the declarant is

not necessary. 3 1

Id. at 734, 610 N.E.2d at 373, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
Id. at 734-35, 610 N.E.2d at 373, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
Id. at 736, 610 N.E.2d at 373, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
Id. at 736, 610 N.E.2d at 374, 594 N.Y.S.2d at 701. See GARY
SHAW, CANmDO ON EviDENCE LAW OF NEV YoRK § XIV(g)(6), at 228
(1995).
27. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d at 737, 610 N.E.2d at 374, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
28. 86 N.Y.2d 501, 658 N.E.2d 192, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1995) (holding
that a declarant does not have to be unavailable in order to admit evidence
under New York's present sense impression hearsay exception).
29. Id. at 503-04, 658 N.E.2d at 193, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 416.
30. Id. at 506, 658 N.E.2d at 195, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 418.
31. FED. R. Evm. 803(1); Buie, 86 N.Y.2d at 506, 658 N.E.2d at 195,
634 N.Y.S.2d at 418. The Buie court noted that, while the declarant's
unavailability is not required for admissibility, trial judges still retain the
power to deny admission of evidence under the present sense hearsay exception
in instances where the probative value of such evidence is outweighed by
undue prejudice via its admission. Id.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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Rule 803(1) and the New York common law rule are similar in
application. However, there is one primary distinction: the
requisite corroboration necessary for admission. According to
Rule 803(1), corroboration is not a requirement. The theoretical
foundation of Rule 803(1) renders present sense impressions
reliable even though further corroboration is not present. As
stated in the Advisory Committee's Note, "[tihe underlying
theory of Exception (1) is that substantial contemporaneity of
event and statement [negate] the likelihood of deliberate or
conscious misrepresentation." 32 Conversely, after Brown, the
33
New York State courts require corroboration to some degree:
The court [in Brown] declined to rule what level of corroboration

will be sufficient to permit admissibility of a present sense
impression. It expressly declined to adopt the "equally percipient
witness" rule, by which the present sense impression must be
corroborated by a witness who was at the scene and had an equal
opportunity to perceive the event, and who will be subject to
cross-examination as to the accuracy of the declarant's statement.
It also expressly declined to adopt a no corroboration rule.
Instead, it stated what corroboration will be sufficient will
depend on the circumstances of each case and must be left
largely to the sound discretion of the trial court. 34

32. FED. R. EvID. 803(1) advisory committee's note.
33. See Brown, 80 N.Y.2d at 736, 610 N.E.2d at 374, 594 N.Y.S.2d at
701.
34. See SHAW, supra note 26, § XIV(g)(6), at 228.
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